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Abstract: Most continuous-variable quantum key distribution schemes are
based on the Gaussian modulation of coherent states followed by continuous
quadrature detection using homodyne detectors. In all previous schemes,
the Gaussian modulation has been carried out in conjugate quadratures thus
requiring two independent modulators for their implementations. Here, we
propose and experimentally test a largely simplified scheme in which the
Gaussian modulation is performed in a single quadrature. The scheme is
shown to be asymptotically secure against collective attacks, and considers
asymmetric preparation and excess noise. A single-quadrature modulation
approach renders the need for a costly amplitude modulator unnecessary,
and thus facilitates commercialization of continuous-variable quantum key
distribution.
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1. Introduction
The quantum informational primitive of quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
(Alice and Bob) to distill a secret key using an untrusted quantum channel and an authenticated
classical channel [1]. Various forms of QKD have been proposed and experimentally realized
in laboratories and under real-life field conditions [3, 4], and they can be roughly divided into
two different categories which depend on the actual measurement strategy at Bob’s station:
Measurement of a discrete variable (DV) – the photon number – carried out by photon counters
or measurement of a continuous variable (CV) [5] – the field quadratures – performed by a
homodyne detector. They are referred to as DVQKD and CVQKD, respectively.
While DVQKD is the most matured scheme in terms of security proofs [6,7], secure commu-
nication distance [8] and real-life field tests [9,10], the scheme of CVQKD is rapidly becoming
a serious competitor due to recent promising developments. This includes the recent advances in
deriving composable security proofs [11–13], the development of very efficient post-processing
algorithms for the distillation of a secret shared key from the raw key [14–16], the implementa-
tions of long-distance QKD [17] and the recent developments of more advanced protocols such
as measurement-device-independent CVQKD [18] and squeezed states QKD [16, 19]. More-
over, most protocols of CVQKD benefit from the fact that the associated technology required
for real-world integration is based on standard telecommunication components.
Coherent state based CVQKD protocols can be distinguished by the different input alphabets.
Previous proposals have included discrete [20–22] as well as continuous [23, 24] modulation
patterns of Gaussian states in phase space. Most of these schemes are based on the modulation
of states in conjugate bases, similarly to the famous BB84 protocol [25] where a polarization
eigenstate is modulated in conjugate bases. In BB84, the swapping between conjugate bases
is an absolute necessity for establishing security, but this is not the case for the modulation of
Gaussian states. In this case, the modulated states are not eigenstates of the modulation basis
(in contrast to BB84) but non-orthogonal, and thus the basic non-orthogonality requirement for
secure communication is fulfilled even in a single basis [26,27]. Single-quadrature modulation
has been considered for a two-state protocol with coherent states [27,28] and for the continuous
modulation of squeezed states [29] followed by homodyne detection.
In this Letter we develop a protocol using modulated coherent states in a single quadrature.
Our security analysis includes excess and preparation noise, and we present a proof-of-principle
experimental implementation of the protocol using both homodyne and heterodyne detection.
Single-quadrature CVQKD is highly relevant as it allows for a simplification of the required
technology at the sending station and, thus, leads to an important reduction in the cost. For
a dual-quadrature Gaussian modulation scheme, an amplitude as well as a phase modulator
is needed while the single-quadrature scheme can be implemented with a single modulator,
e.g. leaving out the amplitude modulator. This constitutes a significant reduction in complexity
and cost as an amplitude modulator is based on an interferometric configuration (that must be
stabilized) and is very expensive in terms of optical power consumption.
In preparation of this manuscript we discovered that the idea of a single quadrature CVQKD
protocol has been independently developed by Usenko et al. [30], where the implications of
an asymmetric channel are considered. We finalized our security analysis with inspiration from
this work.
2. Theory
We consider the Prepare-and-Measure CVQKD protocol illustrated in Fig. 1. Random numbers
drawn from a one-dimensional Gaussian alphabet are used to modulate the phase quadrature,
P, at Alice’s station, thereby preparing independent coherent states along a line in phase space.
This is in stark contrast to previous protocols where a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution
is used to drive phase and amplitude quadratures. The prepared states are sent to Bob who
performs a coherent detection of the quadratures, either using a heterodyne detector or a homo-
dyne detector that switches between an amplitude and a phase quadrature measurement. The
list of data obtained by Bob (when he measured the P quadrature) is correlated with the list
of Alice, and this correlation is subsequently used to generate a secret key by means of error
reconciliation and privacy amplification.
The security of the scheme can be addressed by using the theoretical equivalence between
the prepare-and-measure scheme and an entanglement-based scheme [32, 33], see Fig. 1. In
the entanglement-based scheme, Alice prepares an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state of
variance
√
µ ′, keeps one mode of the EPR state to herself and sends the other mode to Bob.
If Alice performs a heterodyne measurement on her mode (that is projecting it onto a coherent
state), the remaining mode will form a 2D Gaussian distribution of coherent states while a
homodyne measurement at Alice will form a 1D Gaussian distribution of squeezed states. A 1D
distribution of coherent states can thus be realized by performing a local squeezing operation
with a squeezing parameter of ξ = log( 4
√
µ ′) onto the second mode before it is sent to Bob.
Assuming that the covariance matrix of the EPR state has the symmetric form
Γ′AB =
[
1
√
µ ′ Z
√
µ ′−1
Z
√
µ ′−1 1√µ ′
]
(1)
with
1=
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Z=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
(2)
EPR
EPR
1-TQ:TQ
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Figure 1. Prepare-and-measure protocol based on modulating a single quadrature (phase)
and equivalent entanglement-based model used to calculate the secret key rate. EPR:
Einstein-Podolsky-Rose source, Sqz: Squeezing operation.
then the local squeezing transforms it to the matrix
ΓAB =

√
µ ′ 0
√
µ ′−1
4
√
µ ′
0
0
√
µ ′ 0 − 4√µ ′√µ ′−1√
µ ′−1
4
√
µ ′
0 1 0
0 − 4√µ ′√µ ′−1 0 µ ′

. (3)
To assess the security of the proposed scheme against collective attacks, we consider a gen-
eralized Gaussian attack, the asymmetric entangling cloner attack, which is the most powerful
attack that can be performed on the quantum channel, in the limit of infinite exchanges, where
Gaussian extremality holds true [5,23]. Such an attack can be executed by a local unitary equiv-
alent to an asymmetric beam splitter with one mode of an EPR state controlled by Eve in the
secondary input port. She also has control over the beam splitting ratio and the degree of asym-
metricity, and is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics. Eve keeps the other mode of
her EPR state in a quantum memory and interferes the first mode with the coherent states sent
by Alice. The interfered mode is saved in another quantum memory. Eve’s information gain in
the limit of infinitely many uses of the channel is upper bounded by the Holevo quantity [5].
In this asymptotic limit, the asymptotic equipartition property applies and both the Shannon
and the von Neumann entropy are well defined quantities [34,35]. Finite key sizes have a subtle
impact on the security proofs [13, 36] which will not be considered in this paper. As a first
approximation, neglecting these issues, one arrives at the following bound on the secret key
rate [1, 5],
R= β I(A : B)−χ(E : X) , (4)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency and I(A : B) is the classical mutual information between
Alice and Bob expressed through the Shannon entropy of the corresponding classical stochastic
variables of the measurements [35]. χ(E : X) is the Holevo quantity [34] between Alice (Bob)
and Eve for direct (reverse) reconciliation, which can be expressed by the von Neumann entropy
S(ρ) = S(Γ) of the quantum state ρ , χ(E : X) = S(E)− S(E|X) [5]. For Gaussian states with
zero mean, ρ can be completely described by its covariance matrix Γ.
The von Neumann entropy for a Gaussian state ρ is given by [5]
S(Γ) =∑
i
g(νi) , (5)
where
g(x) =
x+1
2
log2
(
x+1
2
)
− x−1
2
log2
(
x−1
2
)
, (6)
and νi is the i’th value in the symplectic spectrum of Γ, and the function g(x) is normalized in
units of vacuum noise. The symplectic spectrum is calculated by finding the absolute eigenval-
ues of the matrix iΩΓ, where
Ω=
N⊕
k=1
ω , ω =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
, (7)
with N being the number of modes described by the state ρ .
We include trusted preparation noise in our model to account for its presence in the experi-
mental implementation [37–40]. Theoretically, this is simulated by assuming that the environ-
ment prepares an EPR state, one mode of which is interfered with the signal mode on a beam
splitter with splitting ratio η ≈ 1 before it enters the quantum channel. In the limit of no prepara-
tion noise, this beam splitter will of course substitute part of the EPR state with vacuum noise,
but an appropriate redefinition of the system parameters makes this error insignificant. More
importantly, this approximation does not overestimate the security of the protocol, since the
dilution only reduces the correlations between Alice and Bob. We get the following covariance
matrix,
ΓAκ ′ =
[
A′ C′
C′T K′
]
, (8)
with the submatrices
A′ =

√
µ ′ 0
√
η(µ ′−1)
4
√
µ ′
0
0
√
µ ′ 0 −√η(µ ′−1) 4√µ ′√
η(µ ′−1)
4
√
µ ′
0 η+(1−η)e−2rκ ′ 0
0 −√η(µ ′−1) 4√µ ′ 0 ηµ ′+(1−η)e2rκ ′

(9)
K′ =

1−η+ηe−2rκ ′ 0
√
η(κ ′2−1)e−r 0
0 (1−η)µ ′+ηe2rκ ′ 0 −
√
η(κ ′2−1)er√
η(κ ′2−1)e−r 0 κ ′ 0
0 −
√
η(κ ′2−1)er 0 κ ′
 (10)
C′ =

− η˜
√
µ ′−1
4
√
µ ′
0 0 0
0 η˜
√
µ ′−1 4√µ ′ 0 0
η˜
√
η(e−2rκ ′−1) 0 η˜
√
κ ′2−1e−r 0
0 η˜
√
η(e2rκ ′−µ ′) 0 η˜
√
κ ′2−1er
 , (11)
where η˜ =
√
1−η . µ ′ and κ ′ are the parameters before the redefinition, and the squeezing
parameter r is used to determine the asymmetry of the preparation noise. The dummy parame-
ters are related to the actual protocol parameters by the following equations
ηµ ′+(1−η)e2rκ ′ = µ+κP , (12)
η+(1−η)e−2rκ ′ = 1+κQ , (13)
η(µ ′−1)√
µ ′
=
µ−1√µ , (14)
which have the following solutions
κ ′ =
µ+κP−ηµ ′
(1−η) e
−2r , (15)
r = ln
(
µ+κP−ηµ ′
1+κQ−η
)
/4 , (16)
µ ′2 =
∆
6η
+
2η
∆
, (17)
where the determinant ∆ is given by
∆= 3
√
(12
√
3
√
27µ3−54µ2−4η2 +27µ+108
√
µ3−108√µ)η2 . (18)
After this redefinition we assume the preparation noise to be added to our signal beam to
have the variance κP in the phase quadrature and κQ in the amplitude quadrature, while the
signal variance in the phase quadrature is µ − 1. The environmental modes are not accessible
to the eavesdropper and so the noise is trusted. Letting the environment prepare an EPR state in
this manner conveniently leaves the global state pure.
We propagate ΓAκ ′ through the quantum channel with asymmetric loss parameters TQ and
TP for the amplitude and phase quadratures, respectively, also interfering with Eve’s noisy EPR
state with variances WQ and WP, respectively.
The covariance matrix of the global state following the quantum channel is quite large, so
only the most important submatrix will be presented here. This is the matrix that represents the
two-mode state shared by Alice and Bob.
A =

√
µ ′ 0
√
TQηV ′S
4
√
µ ′
0
0
√
µ ′ 0 −√TPηV ′S 4√µ ′√
TQηV ′S
4
√
µ ′
0 TQκQ+(1−TQ)WQ 0
0 −√TPηV ′S 4√µ ′ 0 TP(µ+κP)+(1−TP)WP

,
(19)
with V ′S = µ
′− 1. Firstly, the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob is, after
some algebra, found to be
IHomo(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
(1−TP)WP+TP(µ+κP)
(1−TP)WP+TP(η+(1−η)κ ′P)
)
. (20)
In the limit of κP = 0 and η = 1 this is similar to the expression one would expect from
a dual quadrature protocol with half the alphabet. For heterodyne detection the expression is
quite similar,
IHete(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
(1−TP)WP+TP(µ+κP)+1
(1−TP)WP+TP(η+(1−η)κ ′P)+1
)
, (21)
with the addition of a unit of vacuum. The relevant transmission in both cases is the one in
the P-quadrature, since this is the encoded quadrature. Similarly, only the excess noise in the
P quadrature degrades the mutual information. However, the excess noise in the conjugate
quadrature has a profound impact on the security, which will be elaborated on later.
The expression for the Holevo bound is significantly more complicated. We begin by con-
sidering the quantity S(E), which denotes the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s EPR state. If
we assume that the eavesdropper is able to purify the global state, it is easy to show that
S(E) = S(ABκ), where S(ABκ) is the von Neumann entropy of the total multimode system of
Alice, Bob and the EPR state which injects the preparation noise. Purification is a useful tech-
nique in this case because it allows one to estimate the information gain of the eavesdropper
without having access to her measurements. Because of the added complication of preparation
noise, there is no (short) closed expression for the von Neumann entropy of this state. The sym-
plectic spectrum of ΓABκ , which represents this global state is easily calculated numerically, for
a given choice of channel and input parameters. Similarly, purification allows the conditional
von Neumann entropies to be written as S(E|B) = S(Aκ|B). Again, since the symplectic eigen-
values, which are used to calculate the von Neumann entropies, do not permit short analytical
expressions, they are calculated numerically and inserted into Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) to calculate
the secret key rate.
Since preparation noise has been incorporated into the security analysis, it makes sense to
also investigate the case of direct, rather than reverse, reconciliation since it is known from
dual quadrature protocols that it offers an advantage in cases of extremely large preparation
noise [31,39,40]. This is done by considering the conditional entropy S(E|A) = S(Bκ|A) rather
than S(E|B) = S(Aκ|B), but otherwise offers no additional computational complications.
A security proof for a dual quadrature protocol usually assumes symmetry between the
quadratures, but for the presented protocol this is naturally not the case. The fact that only
one quadrature is encoded has an important implication, in the sense that the squeezed EPR
correlations in Eq. (19) in the amplitude quadrature are not accessible to Alice and Bob. In
other words, they have no way of estimating TQ. TP is estimated as normal, and the variance of
the amplitude quadrature has to be monitored to detect the level of excess noise in this quadra-
ture. However, monitoring the variance alone is not enough to determine TQ. Fortunately, it
is possible to place a bound on the possible values of TQ, through Heisenberg’s inequality. In
the covariance matrix description the inequality has the form ΓABκ + iΩ ≥ 0, i.e. the matrix
ΓABκ + iΩmust be positive semi-definite. The physicality is tested by a simple numerical deter-
mination of the eigenvalues of this matrix, as they must be non-negative for ΓABκ to be physical.
With this bound one can map out a region of security in (TP,TQ) space. This is done in Fig. 2
where excess noise is added, and from Fig. 2(a) to Fig. 2(b) there is a clear increase in the
size of the region of physicality. If neither excess nor preparation noise is present, the bound
enforces the relation TP = TQ. However, even minute amounts of noise will widen the bound
and since TQ is controllable by the eavesdropper a worst case scenario approach is taken and
TQ is thus always chosen to give the lowest possible rate.
In Fig. 3 we plot the secret key rate as a function of channel attenuation for different detection
strategies both for the 2D and the 1D Gaussian modulation patterns, using reverse reconcilia-
tion. In Fig. 3(a) there is no excess noise, while in Fig. 3(b) WQ =WP = 1.05 SNU. In both
cases we assume no preparation noise. The modulation variance was optimized for each chan-
nel attentuation value to obtain the largest possible secret key rate. The insets of Fig. 3 shows
the secret key rates for an ideal error reconciliation efficiency of β = 100%, while a realistic
value of β = 97% was assumed for the main figure.
In Fig. 4, the secure key rate is plotted for different levels of preparation noise, with reverse
reconciliation in Fig. 4(a) and direct reconciliation in Fig. 4(b).
As was reported by Weedbrook et al., in [40] and Jacobsen et al., in [31], the single quadra-
ture protocol retains its robustness to preparation noise when using direct reconciliation. This is
shown in Fig. 4. From this it is also evident that an optimal non-zero level of preparation noise
exists.
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Figure 2. Theory plots of the region of positive secret key rates using single-quadrature
modulation with a heterodyne detection strategy in terms of the asymmetric channel loss.
The dashed black line is the symmetric value TP = TQ, and the black solid line is the choice
of TQ that minimizes the rate. Plot (a) has excess noise of WP =WQ = 1.005 SNU , while
for (b) WP =WQ = 1.05 SNU. µ = 31 SNU, β = 1 and κQ = κP = 0.
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Figure 3. Theory plots of secret key rates for protocols using single- and dual-quadrature
modulation respectively, with homodyne and heterodyne detection strategies. Both plots
use reverse reconciliation, and plot (a) has no excess noise, while for (b) WQ =WP = 1.05
SNU. The modulation variance was optimized for each protocol and channel attenuation
in the P quadrature to obtain the largest possible secret key rate. β = 97% except for both
insets where β = 100% was assumed.
From the plots in Figs. 2, 3b and 4, it is clear that a single modulated quadrature combined
with the right channel offers quantum security, albeit slightly reduced from a protocol using
both quadratures. In general one has to trade lower key rates and a reduction in tolerated channel
loss for experimental simplicity. In the single quadrature scheme, half of the measurements
(Q-quadrature measurements) are not used for key generation but only for state estimation.
This naturally reduces the rate by a factor of two. It can, however, be partially compensated
by introducing an asymmetry in the heterodyne detector or the switching probability of the
homodyne detector.
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(b) Direct reconciliation
Figure 4. Theory plots of secret key rates with varying degrees of preparation noise in the
encoded quadrature. Plot (a) uses reverse reconciliation, while for (b) direct reconciliation
is used. β = 1, µ = 1000 and WQ =WP = 1.
3. Experiments
Figure 5. Schematic of the experimental setup. At Alice’s station a laser beam was split
into a reference and a signal beam. The signal beam was phase modulated with Gaussian
white noise. After transmission of both beams to Bob, he performed heterodyne detection
by interfering the two equally bright beams at a balanced beam splitter while the phase
was locked to pi/2. Homodyne detection was done by brightening the local oscillator while
dimming the signal beam to satisfy the brightness approximation. The two outputs of the
two photo detectors as well as the noise from the Gaussian white noise generator were
recorded.
We demonstrate the single-quadrature CVQKD schemes with heterodyne and homodyne de-
tection using bulk optical components. A schematic of the experimental setup is shown in Fig. 5.
The optical power and the electronics can be adjusted to make the detection stage function as
either a heterodyne or homodyne detector.
For heterodyning a 1064 nm continuous-wave laser beam was split equally into a reference
(local oscillator) and a signal beam, each carrying a power of 2.8 mW. For homodyning, the
signal power was adjusted to 0.1 mW, while the reference beam (local oscillator) was kept at
2.8 mW. The signal beam was modulated in phase with an electro-optical phase modulator us-
ing Gaussian white noise from a white noise generator. The reference as well as the signal
beam were then transmitted to Bob who performed heterodyne detection which was imple-
mented by interfering both beams at a balanced beam splitter and locking the relative phase
to pi/2. For homodyne detection were interfered at the same beam splitter, but the P and Q
quadratures were measured by switching the quadrature between runs, by locking the relative
phase between the signal and reference beams to pi/2 and 0 respectively. The AC outputs of the
photo detectors were demodulated at 10.5 MHz and low-pass filtered at 100 kHz before being
sampled with a 14 bit data acquisition card with a sampling rate of 500 kHz. For heterodyning,
in post-processing the sum and difference of the two sampled data streams were calculated.
These outputs represent measurements of the amplitude and phase quadrature amplitude, re-
spectively, when both beams have the same optical power. In the homodyne measurement, Q
and P quadrature data is found in post-processing by the difference of the two sampled data
streams. In addition to these measured data (at Bob), we also recorded the data resulting from
the white noise generator (at Alice).
The vacuum reference was measured by disconnecting the white noise generator from the
phase modulator. After that the phase modulation was first set to a modulation variance of
15 dB above vacuum which set the 100% transmission value. For heterodyning, the modulation
variance was subsequently reduced to simulate optical loss in the channel. Since only coherent
states were involved in our implementation this procedure is equivalent to introducing optical
loss. However, this scheme enabled us to perform heterodyne detection in the form described
above, since the requirement of having the same optical power in reference and signal beam
was fulfilled. For homodyne detection, loss was introduced via beamsplitters and waveplates,
as there is no power requirement in the signal beam in this configuration.
For each measurement run we recorded 106 samples and estimated the excess noise and
transmission of the channel. The magnitude of the correlations directly defines the level of the
mutual information, through the formula
I(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
VB
VB−C2AB/VA
)
, (22)
where VB is the variance of Bob’s measurement in the signal quadrature, VA is the variance of
Alice’s input signal, and CAB is the covariance between the data sets. The preparation noise
was determined at 100% transmission where no excess noise introduced by the eavesdropper
is present. This noise level is calculated by subtracting the (properly scaled) input with the out-
put. In the limit of perfect correlations, one would expect such a subtraction to yield zero. Any
residual variance is therefore to be regarded as noise. If the correlations are poor, the prepara-
tion noise consequently goes up. For transmissions lower than unity, the combined excess and
preparation noise is again determined by subtraction. The scaling of the preparation noise with
transmission is known, so any leftover noise in the combined noise must be ascribed to the
eavesdropper, i.e. excess noise.
3.1. Heterodyne results
The results for heterodyne detection are shown in Fig. 6. For heterodyne detection the prepa-
ration noise was determined to κQ = 0.07 SNU and κP = 0.025, which is related to imper-
fect modulation performed by Alice due to a mismatch between the electro-optical modulation
and the recorded data stream of the from an analogue white noise generator. The asymmetric
excess noise levels WQ = 1.004 SNU and WP = 1.005 SNU, respectively, were on the other
hand rather small. The red and blue solid lines in the figure are theory curves calculated with
the above parameters and show good agreement with the measurement data. The extrapolated
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Channe l Loss [dB]
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
S
e
cr
e
t
K
e
y
R
a
te
[b
it
s/
u
se
] Single ,
Dual,
Single ,
Dual,
Figure 6. Experimental results showing the secret key rate calculated from the measured
data for an error reconciliation efficiency of β = 95% and 97%, respectively, with hetero-
dyne detection and reverse reconciliation. The red and the blue solid lines denote theory
curves calculated from the channel parameters. Error bars are smaller than the point size.
The theoretical model includes excess noise, which on average is WQ = 1.004 SNU and
WP = 1.005 SNU, respectively, and preparation noise, which is transmission dependent
trusted noise, an artifact of the imperfect modulation. It is κQ = 0.07 SNU and κP = 0.025
SNU, and µ = 31.2 SNU. For comparison we show the secret key rates that could be ob-
tained using dual-quadrature modulation with heterodyne detection, but otherwise the same
channel.
maximum transmission line for the single-quadrature modulation with heterodyne detection is
slightly above 20 km for an error reconciliation efficiency of β = 95% if an optical fiber with
0.2 dB/km attenuation is employed. For an error reconciliation efficiency of β = 97% about
30 km is achievable. Note that the modulation variance in our experiment was fixed and not
optimized as in the theory plots in Fig. 3b since we wanted to show the agreement of measure-
ment and theory with a simple dependence on the channel loss. For comparison we added
theory curves for a dual-quadrature modulation scheme (green and black solid lines) with the
same channel parameters, but twice the alphabet size (µ−1 signal in both quadratures). In the
intermediate region of 25 km or equivalently 5 dB channel loss, the secret key rate of our single-
quadrature modulation scheme is merely a factor of about 10 lower than with two modulations
in this particular parameter space (β = 97%).
3.2. Homodyne results
The results for homodyne detection are shown in Fig. 7. For homodyne detection the prepa-
ration noise was determined to κQ = 0.03 SNU. The asymmetric excess noise was WQ = 1.01
SNU. Due to experimental imperfections in the modulators WP scaled with the preparation
noise to a maximum value of WP = 1.88 SNU at κP = 30 SNU. The high modulation variance
of the preparation noise in the signal quadrature is responsible for the increase in P quadrature
excess noise, since the modulators are fed with larger signals. The coloured solid lines repre-
sent theoretical rates calculated from the channel parameters, and show good agreement with
the measurement data, though it is not surprising to see dramatic reductions in distance consid-
ering the high excess noise. An extrapolation similar to the one performed for the heterodyne
data gives a maximal distance of about 20 km for an error reconciliation efficiency of β = 97%.
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Figure 7. Experimental results showing the secret key rate calculated from the measured
data for an error reconciliation efficiency of 97%, with homodyne detection and (a) direct
reconciliation or (b) reverse reconciliation. The multiple coloured solid lines denote the-
ory curves calculated from the channel parameters, with varying degrees of P-quadrature
preparation noise. Error bars are smaller than the point size. The theoretical model includes
excess noise, which on average wasWQ = 1.01 SNU. Due to imperfectionsWP scaled with
the preparation noise to a maximum value of WP = 1.88 SNU at κP = 30 SNU. µ = 31
SNU, and in the unencoded quadrature κQ = 0.03 SNU. Direct reconciliation shows ro-
bustness against the preparation noise as expected, though the detrimental scaling of the
excess noise diminishes the positive effect.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have investigated a new, simplified CVQKD scheme based on single-
quadrature modulation as opposed to the traditional dual-quadrature modulation scheme. In
contrast to DVQKD, modulation in conjugate bases is not a requirement for secret key gen-
eration in CVQKD. The secrecy stems from the non-orthogonality of different coherent states
which is obtainable in a single quadrature basis. In this paper we have proven the security for
such a scheme against collective attacks in the asymptotic limit, and we have demonstrated the
protocol experimentally for both heterodyne and homodyne detection, and included prepara-
tion noise in the theoretical description. Due to the extraordinary simplicity of the scheme, we
expect that it will gain commercial interest.
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